We study asymptotic bargaining outcomes in licensing a patented technology of an external patent holder to firms in a Cournot market. Our results are as follows: Under each permissible coalition structure including the grand coalition, the patent holder can extract the entire profits of all licensees in the bargaining set for a coalition structure when the number of firms is large, so the optimal number of licensees is completely determined. Moreover, the bargaining outcome, where the patent holder can gain the maximum profit by licensing to K firms, exactly coincides with the non-cooperative outcome, and cannot be improved upon by any objecting coalitions even if coalition formation for objections entails almost zero cost. Thus, it is strongly stable.
Introduction: licensing and bargaining
We study asymptotic bargaining outcomes in licensing a patented technology of an external patent holder to firms in a Cournot market. Our aim is to compare the bargaining outcomes with non-cooperative outcomes, to consider how stable the bargaining outcomes are, and to examine whether the fair allocation can be realized as the stable bargaining outcomes or not, as the number of firms tends to infinity.
Patent licensing problems in oligopolistic markets have been investigated mainly through non-cooperative mechanisms; (fixed license) fee or (per-unit) royalty in Kamien and Tauman [6] [7] , and auction in Katz and Shapiro [9] [10] . Many subsequent papers studied the optimal licensing mechanisms that maximize the patent holder's revenue. For example, among the above three non-cooperative mechanisms, Kamien, Oren and Tauman [5] (hereafter, KOT) showed that in a Cournot market for a homogeneous good it is never optimal for the external patent holder to license his patented cost-reducing technology by means of royalty only. Muto [15] found that in a Bertrand duopoly with differentiated goods there are cases where it is optimal for an external patent holder to license by means of royalty only. Kamien, Tauman and Zhang [8] studied patent licensing by means of fees for a new product. Muto [13] considered patent licensing under a resale-free situation. Sen [19] , Sen and Tauman [20] and Stamatopoulos and Tauman [21] are the recent developments. 1 Licensing agreements are, however, contract terms signed by the patent holders and licensees basically resulting from bargaining. From this cooperative viewpoint, Tauman and Watanabe [22] gave an interpretation of the patent holder's payoff: As the number of firms tends to infinity, the Shapley value for the patent holder, which measures his fair contribution to the total industry profit, approximates the payoff he obtains in the non-cooperative auction game traditionally studied in the above literature. By considering coalition structures formed by an external patent holder and oligopolistic firms, Watanabe and Muto [23] investigated licensing agreements reached as bargaining outcomes under those coalition structures, to consider the number of licensees that most benefits the patent holder. For this purpose, they considered cooperative solutions for games with coalition structures where no sidepayments among coalitions are allowed as in Aumann and Drèze [1] .
This paper is, in part, an outgrowth of Watanabe and Muto [23] . Their main result is that if the number of licensees that maximizes licensees' total surplus is greater than the number of existing non-licensees, each symmetric bargaining set for a coalition structure is a singleton, so the optimal number of licensees that maximizes the patent holder's revenue is determined. 2 When this condition is not satisfied, however, the patent holder cannot determine how many firms it should negotiate with on license issues. This paper dissolved that problem in the following direction: What if there are infinitely many firms in the Cournot market?
Our results are as follows: (I) Under each permissible coalition structure including the grand coalition, the patent holder can extract the entire profits of all licensees in the bargaining set for a coalition structure when the number of firms is large, so the optimal number of licensees is completely determined. Moreover, the bargaining outcome, where the patent holder can gain the maximum profit by licensing to K firms, exactly coincides with the non-cooperative outcome derived by KOT [5] . (II) The bargaining outcome noted in (I) cannot be improved upon by any objecting coalitions even if coalition formation entails almost zero cost, so it is strongly stable. (III) The fair allocation represented by the Aumann-Drèze value (an extension of the Shapley value to games with coalition structures) cannot be realized as the stable bargaining outcome in our patent licensing game.
A key issue is our choice of a bargaining solution. Watanabe and Muto (2008) showed that the core for a coalition structure is empty, unless the grand coalition forms. The bargaining set for a coalition structure is always non-empty, so it is useful to find bargaining outcomes. Another key issue is how to define the worth of a coalition of players (a patent holder and firms). In bargaining to determine the payments to the patent holder, the worth of a coalition that forms to make an objection to the proposed amount of payments measures the power of the objection. In our patent licensing game, it is assumed that firms are not allowed to form a cartel both in production and in the market. Thus, we define the worth of a coalition simply as the total Cournot equilibrium profits of firms that belong to the coalition, as in Watanabe and Muto [23] . Allowing firms to form cartels, Tauman and Watanabe [22] proposed a different definition of the worth of a coalition, and Driessen, Muto and Nakayama [4] applied another definition in their game on information trading. We discuss these definitions in detail at the end of this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 builds up our patent licensing game. Section 3 defines solutions applied to our game and shows our results. In three separate subsections, we investigate the characteristics of the bargaining outcomes described by the bargaining set for a coalition structure, comparing them with non-cooperative outcomes, considering how stable they are, and examining whether they are fair allocations or not. Section 4 discusses the characteristic functions and related works.
A patent licensing game
We begin this section by describing the outline of our model, and then give a specification of the bargaining issues in the model.
The outline
Consider a Cournot market with the set N n = {1, . . . , n} of identical firms, where 2 ≤ n < ∞. Each firm i ∈ N n produces q i (≥ 0) units of a homogeneous good with the constant unit cost c (> 0) of production. Let q = i∈Nn q i denote the total production level in the market. Each firm faces a downward sloping inverse demand function P (q), where P (0) > c. Assume the following conditions on the demand function, according to KOT [5] ,
A1:
The total revenue function qP (q) is strictly concave in q.
A2:
The demand function Q(p) is decreasing, differentiable for p > 0, and the price elasticity η(p) = −pQ /Q (where Q = dQ/dp) is a non-decreasing function of p.
An agent, who is not a producer, has a patent of a new technology that reduces the unit cost of production from c to c − ε, where 0 < ε < c. 3 This agent is called an external patent holder, and is denoted by player 0. Thus, the set of players of this game is {0} ∪ N n . The profit of firm i is (P (q) − c + ε)q i if it has access to the patented technology (licensee), and (P (q)−c)q i if it has no access to that technology (non-licensee). The external patent holder gains the revenue in return for licensing its patented technology to firms. Otherwise it gains nothing. According to the traditional literature, we assume that the patent is perfectly protected, namely no firm can use the patented technology without the patent holder's permission. 4 The game has three stages. At stage (i), the patent holder selects a subset S n ⊆ N n and invites the firms in S n to negotiate on license issues. No firm in N n \ S n can participate in that negotiation, so they are not licensed. At stage (ii), every firm in S n negotiates with the patent holder over how much it should pay to the patent holder. It is assumed that all the firms in S n that were invited to bargain will buy a license, thus focusing solely on the fees paid to the licensor. (Even if firms 3 Research laboratories and engineering departments at universities are typical examples of such agents, because they have no production facility. 4 So, there is neither piracy nor resale of the patented technology to non-licensees. Muto [14] and
Muto, Nakayama and Quintas [17] investigated resale-proof trades of information which is related to our patent licensing game.
in S n could choose whether or not to buy the license, we would retain the same propositions due to the solution concepts we apply to this model.) All players in {0} ∪ S n (the patent holder and licensees) can communicate within {0} ∪ S n . Firms in N n \ S n (non-licensees) are not allowed to communicate with any players, so they cannot observe how the negotiations run. The payment to the patent holder is made before the next stage. At stage (iii), firms competeà la Cournot (i.e., in quantities) in the market, knowing which firms are licensed or not. They are not allowed to form a cartel both in production and in the market. This is the assumption under which we consider the same situation as in the non-cooperative mechanisms in the literature.
Remark: At stage (ii), a conference might be held by all members of {0} ∪ S n , or the patent holder might negotiate with each firm in S n on a one-by-one basis.
More important is that players in {0} ∪ S n can communicate among themselves. This is a difference from the traditional non-cooperative models where firms cannot communicate with any others.
Bargaining under a coalition structure
In Section 3, we analyze this model backwardly in the spirit of subgame perfection. Before that, we give a specification to stage (ii). Let us begin with stage (iii). Let t n = |T n | for each T n ⊆ N n . When t n firms are licensed, let W (t n ) and L(t n ) denote the Cournot equilibrium profits of each licensee and each non-licensee at stage (iii), respectively. Because η(p) is assumed by A2 to be decreasing in p, these equilibrium profits and the equilibrium price are uniquely determined for any t n such that 0 ≤ t n ≤ n. Let K ≡ c/(εη(c)). We assume K > 1, i.e., non-drastic innovations. (Otherwise the monopoly price under the new technology is less than the competitive price under the old technology. In this case, the patent holder can extract the monopoly profit by licensing his patented technology to only one firm, so the patent licensing problem becomes trivial.) In general, K is not an integer, but for simplicity we treat it as an integer, according to the traditional literature. 5 KOT [5] showed that for any t n such that 0 ≤ t n ≤ n the Cournot equilibrium price p = p(t n ) decreases in t n and p(K) = c, and that W (t n ) and L(t n ) are as follows:
and
where P = dP/dq < 0. For any t n such that 0 ≤ t n ≤ n, W (t n ) decreases in t n , while L(t n ) decreases in t n if 0 ≤ t n < K. Thus, the Cournot equilibrium profits are summarized in the following order:
Given these equilibrium profits are determined at stage (iii), we next formalize the bargaining at stage (ii) as a cooperative game with a coalition structure. Any non-empty subset of {0} ∪ N n is called a coalition. As described above, every firm in coalition {0} ∪ S n is licensed at stage (ii), and firms are not allowed to form a cartel at stage (iii). So, the characteristic function v : 2 {0}∪Nn → R is given by
where v(T n ) represents the worth of a coalition T n ⊆ {0} ∪ N n . The patent holder can gain nothing without licensing because he is not a producer; thus v({0}) = 0. The total Cournot equilibrium profits of licensees in T n is t n W (t n ); thus v({0} ∪ T n ) = t n W (t n ). v(T n ) is the total Cournot equilibrium profits that firms in T n can guarantee for themselves in the worst anticipation when firms in T n jointly break off the negotiation. It is the worst case in our model that all the other n − t n firms are licensed, because of (3). We assume the worst case for coalition T n in the spirit of von Neumann and Morgenstern [26] ; thus, v(T n ) = t n L(n − t n ). (The definition of v(T n ) from this pessimistic viewpoint plays no important role in the proofs of our propositions.)
For a non-empty set S n ⊆ N n of licensees determined at stage (i), the permissible coalition structure is denoted by P Sn = ({0} ∪ S n , {{i}} i∈Nn\Sn ), because players in {0} ∪ S n can communicate with one another but non-licensees are not allowed to communicate with any players. (All firms behave independently in the market at stage (iii).) Let s n = |S n |. The set of imputations under the coalition structure P Sn is defined as
Players in {0} ∪ S n divide the total Cournot equilibrium profits of licensees, each i ∈ {0} ∪ S n being guaranteed the worst payoff v({i}). Each of non-licensees in N n \ S n obtains the equilibrium profit L(s n ), because s n firms are licensed. Let ({0}∪N n , v, P Sn ) denote a cooperative game with the coalition structure P Sn . Every vector of payoffs for players should be in I Sn . (This requirement is slightly weakened in Subsection 3.2.) The solutions for this cooperative game are defined and derived within subsections in Section 3. We consider only a subset S n of licensees with S n = ∅, because the patent holder can guarantee the payoff zero by itself.
Asymptotic bargaining outcomes
In this section, for a coalition structure given at stage (i), we consider the bargaining set, the least core, and the Aumann-Drèze value as solutions that predict bargaining outcomes at stage (ii). The following lemmas, which are used to prove our propositions, are a variant of the Cournot limit theorem: If there are infinitely many firms in the Cournot market, then non-licensees obtain nothing, because the Cournot equilibrium price p = p(t n ) falls to or below their unit cost c of production regardless of the number t n of licensees. The formal proof is shown in the Appendix.
Note that T n is a subset of N n when n is fixed, i.e., t n ≤ n, but t n may tends to infinity as n tends to infinity. In this paper, we confine our consideration to sequences of coalitions whose number of elements converges or diverges.
The bargaining set for a coalition structure
When the solution is empty at stage (ii), we cannot answer our question on how many licenses the patent holder should sell to firms through negotiations. In a more general patent licensing game than ours, Watanabe and Muto [23] showed that the core for a coalition structure is always empty, unless the grand coalition {0} ∪ N n forms. On the other hand, the bargaining set for a coalition structure is always non-empty, which was shown by Davis and Maschler [3] and Peleg [18] .
Let us begin with defining the relevant notions. Let i, j ∈ {0} ∪ S n and x ∈ I Sn . We say that i has an objection (y,
We say that i has a "valid" objection (y, T n ) against j at x if there exists no counter objection to i's objection (y, T n ). The bargaining set for a coalition structure P Sn is defined as M Sn = {x ∈ I Sn |no player in {0} ∪ S n has a valid objection at x}.
We simply call M Nn the bargaining set, which was originally defined in Aumann and Maschler [2] . (They did not consider a coalition structure explicitly.) Our first proposition suggests that under each permissible coalition structure except the grand coalition, the patent holder can extract the entire profits of all licensees in the bargaining set for a coalition structure when the number of firms is infinitely large.
Proof. Take any x n ∈ M Sn with S n = N n . First, we show that lim n→∞ i∈Nn x n i = 0. Consider the following two cases.
Order all the n firms according to their profits in the non-decreasing order, and take the first s n firms. Let T n be the set of the first s n firms. Note that x n j = L(s n ) for j ∈ N \ S because x n ∈ I Sn . Then, the patent holder has an objection(y, {0} ∪ T n ) against i because (3) and x n ∈ I Sn .) By Lemma 1 and the squeeze theorem, lim n→∞ i∈Nn
. Thus, by Lemma 1 and the squeeze theorem, lim n→∞ i∈Nn x n i = 0. Next, we complete the proof. Because lim n→∞ i∈Nn x n i = 0 and x n i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N n , lim n→∞ x n i = 0. As shown above, lim n→∞ i∈Nn
Watanabe and Muto [23] showed that the symmetric bargaining set for a coalition structure is a singleton under a certain condition. Proposition 1 shows that when there are infinitely many firms in the Cournot market, the patent holder's profit realized by the bargaining set for a coalition structure is uniquely determined, regardless of whether there are symmetric or asymmetric payoffs for the licensees, unless the grand coalition forms. We refer to the case of the grand coalition, i.e., M Nn , as a corollary in Subsection 3.2. (We can extend Proposition 1 to S n = N n .)
Let us now consider the optimal number of licensees to be selected at stage (i). The next lemma suggests the answer; s n = K when the number of firms is infinitely large. So, there is no need for referring to the bargaining set M Nn . The intuition is that all non-licensees are driven out of the market when K or more firms are licensed, and the Cournot equilibrium price goes down as the number of licensees increases, so the competition among licensees in the market results in the reduction of the total Cournot equilibrium profit s n W (s n ). The formal proof is shown in the Appendix.
By this lemma, we can show the next proposition which suggests that, for infinitely large n, the patent holder can gain the maximum profit εQ(c) as a stable bargaining outcome by licensing his patented technology to K firms.
Proof. Suppose S n N n . By Proposition 1, for any x n ∈ M Sn , lim n→∞ x n 0 = lim n→∞ s n W (s n ). Lemma 2 suggests that s n W (s n ) be maximized at s n = K for infinitely large n. As noted in Subsection 2.2, KOT [5] showed p(K) = c. Thus, by (1), the patent holder obtains
Among three non-cooperative mechanisms such as fixed license fee, per-unit royalty and auction, KOT [5] showed that if the magnitude ε of innovation is not too small, then it is optimal for the patent holder to auction off K licenses, otherwise it is optimal to sell K licenses to firms by means of a fixed license fee. Eventually, for the infinitely large number n of firms in the Cournot industry, the market price drops to c, non-licensees exit the market, and the patent holder extracts the entire industry profit εQ(c). 6 Proposition 2 implies that the bargaining outcome obtained by applying the bargaining set for a coalition structure exactly coincides with the non-cooperative outcome. In other words, the non-cooperative outcome can be reached through bargaining as the stable outcome when the Cournot market is very large (i.e., the number of firms is infinitely large).
The least core for a coalition structure
In this subsection, we consider the least core for a coalition structure, in order to provide another strong meaning for the result suggested by Proposition 2, by investigating the relationship between these two solutions.
To define the least core, we begin with defining the -core for a coalition structure P Sn , which is given for any ∈ R as
where
is called the set of pre-imputations for a coalition structure P Sn . The real number is interpreted as the cost that is needed to form an objecting coalition T n . Evidently, C Sn = ∅ if is large enough, so we can apply this solution to stage (ii) to find bargaining outcomes. When = 0, C Sn is simply called the core C Sn for a coalition structure P Sn . Clearly, C Sn ⊆ C Sn whenever < , with strict inclusion
The least core for a coalition structure P Sn is defined as
Let 0 be the smallest such that C Sn = ∅, that is,
It is known that LC Sn = C Sn 0 . Let s * n denote the number of licensees that maximizes their total surplus, i.e.,
for any s n = 1, . . . , n. This number plays an important role in this subsection, whose properties are shown in the next lemma.
Lemma 3. In the Cournot market, the following properties on s
* n hold: (a) s * n ≤ K. (b) lim n→∞ s * n = K.
Proof. (a)
. We first show that, for any t n such that
, where p = p(t n ) is the Cournot equilibrium price when t n firms are licensed, so
By a general property of the Cournot equilibrium price that [5] showed that, for any t n = 1, . . . , n, p(t n ) decreases in t n . Thus, ∂v({0} ∪ T n )/∂t n < 0. Let us now give the proof of (a). Suppose that there exists s * n with s
which implies that 1 > η(p)(p−c+ε)/p. As noted in Subsection 2.2, KOT
As shown above, for each t n with t n ≥ K, v({0}∪T n ) decreases in t n , so the left-hand side of (4) 
By Lemma 2, for infinitely large n, s n W (s n ) is maximized when s n = K. Thus, s * n = K if n is infinitely large.
We here briefly refer to M Nn . Assuming the same payoffs for all licensees, Watanabe and Muto [23] 
showed in their Proposition 4 (a) that if n > s
, where x n ∈ M Nn . Lemma 3 (b) suggests that n > s * n holds for infinitely large n. By Lemma 1, lim n→∞ nL(0) = 0. Thus, if x n ∈ M Nn , then lim n→∞ nW (n) ≤ lim n→∞ x n 0 . On the other hand, x n 0 ≤ nW (n) = v({0} ∪ N ). Therefore, if x n 0 ∈ M Nn , then lim n→∞ x n 0 = lim n→∞ nW (n) and lim n→∞ x n i = 0 for all i = 0, by the squeeze theorem.
Corollary 1.
Take any x n ∈ M Nn . Then, in the Cournot market, lim n→∞ x n 0 = lim n→∞ nW (n) and lim n→∞ x n i = 0 for all i = 0.
Before proceeding to the least core, confirm that the core C Sn is empty for any permissible coalition structure in our model. This is the reason why we chose the bargaining set for a coalition structure as our solution.
Proposition 3. In the Cournot market, if n > K, then C
Proof. Without specifying the market structure, Watanabe and Muto [23] showed in their Propositions 1 and 2 that C Sn = ∅ if S n = N n , and that C Nn = ∅ if and only if s * n = n. In the Cournot market, by Lemma 3 (a), s * n = n if n > K. Thus, C Sn = ∅ for any permissible coalition structure.
We now proceed to the relationship between the least core and the bargaining set for a coalition structure. Let us begin with showing the next lemma. 
Proof. By Proposition 3, C S
Finally, by Lemma 3 (b) and Lemma 1,
Therefore, by the squeeze theorem, lim n→∞ * 0 = +0.
Applying Lemma 4, we state the relationship between the least core and the bargaining set as the next proposition. 
. By the definition of I
On the other hand, for any sufficiently large n such that 2K < n, 2s * n ≤ 2K < n, so we can take
Accordingly, by Lemmas 1, 3 (b) and 4 and by the squeeze theorem,
as shown in the proof of Proposition 2. Next, we show that lim n→∞ x * n i = 0 for each licensee i ∈ S * n . As shown above,
. Accordingly, by Lemmas 1 and 4, lim n→∞ x * n i = 0 for each licensee i ∈ S * n . Lastly, for any non-licensee i ∈ N n \ S * n , lim n→∞ x * n i = lim n→∞ L(s * n ) = 0 by Lemma 3 (b) and (3).
For a given coalition structure, the least core LC Sn is the subset of I Sn p that cannot be improved upon by any objecting coalitions if coalition formation for objections entails a cost of at least 0 . In this sense, the bargaining outcomes are strongly stable if they are in the least core with very small (nearly or less than zero). Proposition 4 together with Proposition 2 jointly suggest that when there are infinitely many firms in the Cournot market, the bargaining outcome obtained by the bargaining set for a coalition structure P S * n , where the patent holder can gain the maximum profit, cannot be improved upon by any objecting coalitions even if coalition formation entails almost zero cost. Therefore, we can say that the bargaining outcome that the patent holder gains the maximum profit εQ(c) is strongly stable, when the Cournot market is very large.
The Aumann-Drèze value
It is well known that the Shapley value is not necessarily in the core, but its relationship with the bargaining set has not been studied comprehensively. The Shapley value is frequently interpreted as a fair allocation, while the bargaining set is regarded as a stable bargaining outcomes. Accordingly, the inclusion of the Shapley value in the bargaining set implies that the fair allocation can be realized through bargaining as a stable outcome. Watanabe and Tauman [24] showed, however, that the Shapley value of their patent licensing game is not in the bargaining set when the linear Cournot market is very large.
In this subsection, we examine the relationship of those solutions for a coalition structure, although our characteristic function differs from the one defined by Watanabe and Tauman [24] . (We discuss the difference in Section 4.) Aumann and Drèze [1] defined the Shapley value for a coalition structure (as well as other solutions) and provided a set of axioms that characterizes the value. We hereafter call it the Aumann-Drèze value.
Let ϕ Sn denote the Aumann-Drèze value of our cooperative game with a coalition structure P Sn . Let s n = |S n | and t = |T | for T ⊆ S n . The Aumann-Drèze value ϕ Sn 0 for the patent holder is represented by
There are s n !/(t!(s n − t)!) orderings with the same marginal contribution
] of the patent holder because licensees in S n are identical. Thus, the Aumann-Drèze value ϕ Sn 0 of the patent holder is given by
By the axioms of relative efficiency and symmetry (Aumann and Drèze [1] 
The Aumann-Drèze value is player i's average marginal contribution to coalitions in the coalition to which i belongs under a coalition structure P Sn , so it is interpreted as representing a fair allocation.
Proof. We first show that, for each t n such that 0 ≤ t n ≤ K, lim n→∞ p(t n ) = c. As a general property, the Cournot equilibrium price p = p(t n ) satisfies
where t n is the number of licensees. (See, e.g., KOT [5] .) As noted in Subsection 2.2, for any t n with 0 ≤ t n ≤ n, the Cournot equilibrium price p = p(t n ) decreases in t n and
Confirm that lim
Therefore, for each t n with 0 ≤ t n ≤ K,
by the squeeze theorem. Let us give the proof of Lemma 5. When t n ≤ K, by η(p) = −pQ /Q and Q = 1/P (i.e., dQ/dp = 1/(dP/dq)), (5) is rewritten as
Thus, by (1),
where p = p(t n ) is the Cournot equilibrium price. By (6), lim n→∞ p(t n ) = c. Note that, by (5),
Thus, by 0 < ε < ∞,
Now we are ready to prove the next proposition. By Proposition 1, in the Cournot market, for any S N , if x n ∈ M Sn , lim n→∞ x n 0 = lim n→∞ s n W (s n ).
Proof. For any T n such that T n ⊆ N n and T n = ∅, lim n→∞ t n L(n − t n ) = 0, by Lemma 1. Thus, for any S n such that T ⊆ S n ,
We briefly refer to the case of s n > K. For any t n such that t n ≥ K, v({0} ∪ T n ) = t n W (t n ) decreases in t n , as shown at the beginning of the proof of Lemma 3, so s n W (s n ) < tW (t) when K ≤ t < s n . By an analogy to the Cournot limit theorem applied to non-licensees (Lemma 1), if we could obtain lim n→∞ tW (t) = lim n→∞ s n W (s n ), then it would be clearly that
which plays an essential role in proving Proposition 5. Even if n tends to infinity, however, t W (t ) does not vary whenever K ≤ t , because (n − t ) non-licensees exit the market and so the number of firms producing in the market does not change. Consequently, we cannot necessarily obtain a clear relationship between these two solutions when s n > K. As far as any S n N n with s n ≤ K, however, we found that the AumannDrèze value is not in the bargaining set for a coalition structure P Sn in a very large Cournot market. Further, Proposition 1 and Lemma 3 suggest that, in such a very large Cournot market, the patent holder chooses a subset S * n of firms at stage (i) with s * n = K, so that he gains the maximum profit εQ(c) as a stable bargaining outcome. All these insights jointly imply that the fair allocation cannot be reached through bargaining as the stable outcome realized in our patent licensing game.
Thus, let us finally compute the Aumann-Drèze value when the patent holder negotiates with s * n firms in a very large Cournot market, so that we can see how far the fair allocation is from the stable bargaining outcome. By lemma 3 (b), s * n = K for infinitely large n.
Proposition 6. In the Cournot market,
Proof. By Lemma 3 (b), for infinitely large n, s * n = K. By Lemma 5, for any t such
Wooders and Zame [25] showed that, for a broad class of games, the Shapley value is in the -core and is very small if the game has infinitely many players, i.e., fair allocations are strongly stable in such large games. 8 Proposition 6 indicates, however, that the fair allocation is far from the stable bargaining outcome by as much as εQ(c)/2 from the patent holder's viewpoint, so the difference between the fair allocation and the stable outcome is not small.
In our patent licensing game, the patent holder acts as a big boss in the sense that no firm can use his patented technology without his permission and all nonlicensees incur disadvantage compared with licensees. Although our patent licensing game is not formulated as a large game, the existence of a big boss is the essential point that induces our asymptotic result on the Aumann-Drèze (Shapley) value to be different from Wooders and Zame's result: They considered a class of games including private exchange economies (with divisible and indivisible goods) coalitionproduction economics, etc., where there is no such agent who plays a remarkably important role like a big boss. 9 8 Kats and Tauman [11] studied the asymptotic inclusion relationship of the Shapley value in the core in replicated production economies with divisible and indivisible inputs, where only a limited number of permitted firms have access to a better production technology, assuming that every firm is a price taker. 9 Muto et al. [16] considered some solutions to a class of games where there exists a big boss in the context of information trading. They required a monotonicity for the characteristic function v and did not have to take into account any coalition structures. These are the major differences with our patent licensing games.
Remarks on the related literature
The characteristic function we defined in Subsection 2.2 does not necessarily exhibit super-additivity that is often presumed in the cooperative analysis. (A characteristic function v is super-additive if v (S ∪ T ) ≥ v (S) + v (T ) for all coalitions S and T with S ∩ T = ∅.) Super-additivity is the feature of characteristic functions required in analyzing how to divide the total payoff in the grand coalition, because the grand coalition may not actually form without it. It would not be a pre-requisite in games where there is no need for players to form the grand coalition. In fact, Aumann and Drèze [1] did not require the super-additivity for analysis of games with coalition structures. This paper prohibits firms from forming any cartels in the market, because we wished to consider the same situation as in the non-cooperative analysis in the literature. A coalition is thus regarded as merely a group within which communication among its members is allowed. This is one of the reasons why our characteristic function does not necessarily satisfy super-additivity.
To confirm this, consider a linear Cournot market with P (q) = max(a − q, 0), where c < a < ∞. If the size of a coalition {0}∪S n is not so large that |S n | ≤ (n+1)/2 and |S n | ≤ K, our characteristic function v({0} ∪ S n ) takes the same values as the ones derived by the characteristic function in Tauman and Watanabe [22] , which is described as follows. The firms in {0} ∪ S n can merge into a single entity or can operate a few (or all) of the licensees and shut down the others. Suppose that {0} ∪ S n operates m licensees and shuts down s n − m firms, where 1 ≤ m ≤ s n . The complement, N n \S n , can also operate some non-licensees, say l, where 1 ≤ l ≤ n−s n and shut down the other n − s n − l firms. It is assumed that the m + l active firms compete in the marketà la Cournot. Given m and l, the Cournot profits of each licensee and each non-licensee are denoted by W (m, l) and L(m, l), respectively. Tauman and Watanabe [22] defined the worth of coalition {0} ∪ S n as the largest total Cournot profit of {0} ∪ S n given the most offensive strategy of the complement: The worth of coalition S n is defined in the same way. 10 They showed that the maxmin value coincides with the minmax value for any sets S n of firms. The maxmin 10 Watanabe and Tauman [24] proposed a sophisticated definition of the characteristic function under a subtle mixture of conflict and cooperation. Tauman and Watanabe [22] gave a simpler interpretation to it. Jelnov and Tauman [12] considered another approach related to Tauman and Watanabe [22] , where l and m are determined as a Nash Equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game played by two coalitions {0} ∪ S n and Nn \ S n , instead of the minmax value.
or minmax approach itself is a well-known way to derive status quo points in twoperson bargaining problems from non-cooperative games. This characteristic functionṽ exhibits the super-additivity. Thus, we can see that prohibiting any cartels in the market causes our characteristic function v not necessarily to be super-additive.
By the definition of the super-additive characteristic functionṽ, the patent holder and all firms form the grand coalition to divide the monopoly profit. Tauman and Watanabe showed with their characteristic functionṽ that when the market is very large, the patent holder's share of the monopoly profit is the same as the payoff he obtains in the non-cooperative auction game. Thus, it is not unnatural that, with our characteristic function v, the Aumann-Drèze value does not coincide with the vector of payoffs in non-cooperative auction game when the market is very large.
We can retain super-additivity even if firms cannot form any cartels in the market; the characteristic function used in Driessen, et al. [4] (applied to a game of information trading). In our context, a patented technology is licensed in the most efficient way among a seller and potential buyers of that technology, i.e., v({0} ∪ S n ) = max 0≤t≤s n
tW (t) + (s n − t)L(t),
where W (0) = L(0). Note that W (t) = W (t, n − t) and L(t) = L(t, n − t) in the notation of Tauman and Watanabe [22] . Let t * be the maximizer of tW (t) + (s n − t)L(t). According to this definition ofv, a patented technology is not necessarily licensed to all the potential buyers in coalition S n , whereas s n − t * non-buyers share the total profit of their coalition through sidepayments in reward for their cooperation for efficient sharing of a patented technology. They would, however, incur disadvantage when another patented technology is innovated; because they do not have the currently latest technology, they would suffer from lack of that technology even if newly innovated technology is licensed to them. So, we did not usev.
